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A.D.P. HEENEY: THE ORDERLY UNDER-SECRETARY, 1949-1952
Francine McKenzie
Department of History
University of Western Ontario
Abstract: A.D.P. Heeney was under-secretary of the department of external affairs from
1949-1952. When he became under-secretary, the department was under strain. It had
grown rapidly in size and scope in the 1940s, but it did not function smoothly. Heeney
excelled at administration. During his term, he established new divisions and sections,
overhauled the administrative systems of the department, increased communication, and
improved work conditions for employees. Heeney also had definite views about the
substance of foreign policy and the conduct of Canadian diplomacy. He believed that trade
was a vital component of foreign policy. And he believed that the best way to conduct
relations with the US was through quiet diplomacy, an approach that fell out of favour as
anti-American sentiment swelled in Canada in the 1960s. Although he had a long-term
influence on the development of the department, he was more of a renovator than an
architect.

Arnold Heeney belonged to the cohort of famed Ottawa Men of the 1940s and 1950s.
Although he is less well known than some of his contemporaries, such as than Lester
Pearson, Norman Robertson, Hume Wrong and Escott Reid – certainly historians refer to him
less often – he too made an important and lasting contribution to the department of external
affairs. While he was under-secretary (1949-1952) the department was characterized by a
common sense of purpose, confidence in the talent of Canada’s diplomats, determination to
engage in foreign policy on a global scale, urgency about the stakes involved, and a frenzied
pace of work. The department was also a fertile source of ideas about Canada’s aims and
interests in world affairs, as well as issues related to the postwar, and Cold War, world. But
Heeney understood that for all of its strengths and vitality, it suffered from inefficient
organization which undermined the realization of Canadian foreign policy and offset the skill
of Canada’s diplomats. Heeney brought impressive administrative and organizational talents
to the department, long overdue qualities in an under-secretary. The fact that Heeney came
to the department from outside was also significant to the work he did in the department. He
had worked in the prime minister’s office and the privy council office for over ten years
before moving to the department of external affairs. This experience shaped his priorities as
an administrator and sharpened his skills. But perhaps most important of all, it permitted him
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to envision a different kind of department from the one that had been nurtured under O.D.
Skelton.

Background and Early Life:
In 1902, Britain barely squeaked out a victory in the Anglo-Afrikaner war, Queen
Victoria’s long and glorious reign came to an end, and the Anglo-Japanese alliance was
negotiated to offset the gap between Britain’s global commitments and over-stretched
resources. Although the sun was beginning to set on the British empire, it was into a British
world that Heeney was born that same year. The son of an Anglican minister – Bertal
Heeney - and Eva Holland, the daughter of an Anglo-Montreal merchant, Heeney recorded in
his memoirs, ‘from the very first I was surrounded by British influences.’1 His childhood
was steeped in British heroes, history, values and the adventure stories of G.A. Henty. In
1909, the family moved to Winnipeg where his father became the rector for St Luke’s parish.
Heeney’s immersion in the British world was reinforced at St. John’s College school: the
academic culture there was one of rugged intellectualism with rugby and hockey being the
principal games.2 In 1918, Heeney attended the University of Manitoba where he studied
English and French languages and literatures. He attained a high level of fluency and sports
remained a priority. He recollected being ‘quite disproportionately proud’ to be captain of
the football team in his final year. He hoped to attend Oxford and he applied for a Rhodes
scholarship in 1921. His first application was not successful. Instead, he studied for an M.A.
in English at the University of Manitoba – his choice of thesis topic, on the poetry of Rupert
Brooke, comes as no surprise – and took up a position of a junior master at his old school, St
John’s. He was named a Rhodes scholar for Manitoba the next year.
I am grateful to John Hilliker for reading a draft of this paper. Mike Aloissi provided helpful research
assistance, for which I am also grateful.
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Although many Canadians in Oxford initially experienced a sense of cultural
dislocation, Heeney fit right in: ‘from the beginning I had a sense of belonging’.3 As was
typical of Rhodes scholars then, and which Oxford culture celebrated, he devoted himself to
sports (rugby and rowing) and society (the King Charles Dining Club, the Ralegh Club4, and
the Colonial Club). He met many interesting people, some of whom he would later work
with in the department of external affairs. Like many a Canadian student, he was selected to
play on the Blues ice hockey team which afforded opportunities to travel on the continent.
Academics were not the first priority for Heeney, or for the university. As the provost of
Oriel college put it in 1914: ‘show me a researcher and I will show you a fool.’ Oxford’s
curriculum was traditional and disdainful of new subjects of study.5 Heeney’s college was
St. John’s, not one of the leading academic colleges at the time, but he studied modern
history, a subject that was taken seriously. However he admitted in letters home that it was
not easy to buckle down to study: ‘I like my work when I am at it; it’s the initial effort that
causes all the trouble.’6 He earned a respectable second class standing, a result that
suggested he had a solid mind but not a sparkling one. Although Oxford was an enchanted
enclave, Heeney spent some time reflecting on the world beyond the spires, for instance
during the English general strike of 1926, although unlike Norman Robertson, his classmate
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and roommate, Heeney supported the government.7 For the handsome, polished, popular and
well-dressed Arnold (Robertson declared that Heeney was ‘quite the most prosperous
looking Rhodes scholar’8), his Oxford stint was idyllic.
Despite being steeped in the English part of Canada9 and having studied in England,
Heeney was assured of his Canadian identity. Growing up in Winnipeg in the early 20th
century contributed to the easy balance he struck between appreciation of all things English
and a confident sense of purpose and destiny for an independent Canada.10 As he put it, ‘Of
this gospel John W. Dafoe was the prophet and the Manitoba Free Press the inspired
word.’11 Direct exposure to the British mother-country did not dilute his national identity.
He recorded in his diary while in Oxford: ‘No fear that I have turned Englander. I am as
much a Canadian as ever whether this is to my credit or no.’12
Heeney returned to Canada to study law. He married Margaret Yuile – a student in
the history class he taught at McGill - and soon joined the law firm of Meredith, Holden,
Heward & Holden in Montreal. He continued to move in elite circles, particularly in AngloMontreal; his social circle included F.R. Scott, Eugene Forsey, Doug Abbott and Brooke
Claxton. He also made some important connections with French Quebeckers. For instance
he was a junior lawyer on a file with Louis St Laurent, one of the legal titans in Quebec. By
the mid-1930s, Heeney was well-established as a lawyer, a lecturer in the law faculty at
McGill, enjoyed interesting professional opportunities (for instance as counsel to the Quebec
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Protestant Education Survey), earned a good income, and his family was growing. But he
was restless and sought out other opportunities.

Into Government Service:
Family connections helped him to find a new career path. His father was a friend of
Prime Minister Mackenzie King. Through his father, Arnold had met the prime minister in
1936; he had made a point of telling the prime minister that he was attracted to public
service.13 King had been impressed with the young Heeney and took note. In 1937, Cannon
Heeney subsequently lobbied for a government appointment for Arnold, such as counsel to
the commission then studying dominion-provincial relations.14 Heeney followed up with a
letter to the prime minister, ostensibly to apologize for the excessive enthusiasm of his father.
However, he admitted that he would be pleased to be considered for exactly the kind of
appointment his father had proposed: ‘there is no work in which I would sooner be engaged
than that of the Commission, which I feel will be a land mark in the history of our country.’15
Nothing came of it, however.

But the next year, King proposed that Heeney should become his own principal
secretary. King explained that the role Heeney would fill was comparable to that of Maurice
Hankey, the British civil servant who brought order to the British cabinet during the First
World War.16 Coincidentally, Heeney had heard Hankey speak on cabinet procedure at the
Colonial Club in Oxford in 1925. Hankey’s role appealed. After some hesitation, he
accepted the offer and he and his family relocated to Ottawa.
His decision to change careers permits some reflection on Heeney’s character. First,
when he corresponded with his father about the pros and cons of the prime minister’s offer,
he admitted to having a second class mind. As he put it, his thoughts were ‘too deliberate and
13
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rather ponderous rather than rapid and intense’.17 Cannon Heeney’s response was that of a
typical parent: he believed his son’s abilities were great. Yet he added, ‘Without agreeing
with that utterance…your strength is your character.’18 Heeney was not an intellectual. His
intelligence showed itself in practical matters rather than in concepts or abstraction. Second,
he was certain that he could do great work. Heeney’s career path was driven by ambition to
be in important posts where his judgment would count, along with concerns about prestige
and income. Third, he naturally inclined to civil service. Although his position as principal
secretary to the prime minister was a political appointment, he was not interested in partisan
work, a view he made known to the prime minister.19 Finally, his hesitation in accepting the
offer revealed his aversion to risk and uncertainty. He wrote to the prime minister outlining
what he believed his position entailed – in effect setting conditions for his employment. This
was bold. And he fretted about what position might await him in the event of a change in
government – under which circumstances he would lose his job in the PMO. King agreed
that he would take up a permanent position in the civil service to protect against such risk.20
Heeney was intelligent, confident, even brazen, well-connected, plain-speaking, ambitious,
good at thinking through long term implications, controlling, and with a natural affinity for
the work he was about to undertake.
Heeney’s early duties in the Prime Minister’s Office were to prepare the prime
minister for cabinet meetings, consult with other government departments, and write press
releases and speeches.21 He was not able to improve the workings of government until 1940
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when he became both clerk of the privy council and secretary to the cabinet. At this time,
there were still no agendas for cabinet meetings; no minutes were kept; no conclusions on
policy issues were recorded.22 Heeney knew this unstructured approach had to change in two
basic ways. Records had to be kept and information had to be disseminated. The onset of
the Second World War made reform urgent if the government was to meet the increased
volume and pace of work efficiently. The importance of preparing for meetings, such as
through the advance circulation of memoranda, recording decisions for future reference, and
following through by communicating the conclusions to those interested and affected, might
seem self-evident but these were novel, even radical changes, and Mackenzie King resisted
them because they constrained his latitude and subtracted from his power. For instance, if
cabinet meetings followed agendas, then the prime minister could not dictate what was and
was not discussed.23 Circulating agendas before meetings also gave ministers time to
consider their positions more fully than would otherwise have been the case.24 Taking
minutes meant that there was a record of conclusions and no one had to depend on the prime
minister’s recollection.25 Heeney’s transformation of the business of government was
impressive, particularly as he was able to persuade the prime minister that wartime
innovations should persist in peacetime. As Jack Granatstein concluded, ‘Almost single-
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handedly Heeney had carried the Canadian government into the modern era.’26 Heeney had
also discovered his calling: he was an organization man.

To the Department of External Affairs:
As clerk of the privy council and secretary to the cabinet, the scope of Heeney’s
activities was impressively broad: his portfolio spanned housing to wartime loans to Britain.
Heeney was a skilful generalist, of the type that was particularly valuable as government
work exploded.27 He was involved in many matters of foreign policy and foreign relations
which brought him into contact with O.D. Skelton and Norman Robertson, two of his
predecessors as under-secretary. But there were few indications that he was especially
interested in Canada’s burgeoning international affairs. His move from the PMO/PCO to
DEA in 1949 stemmed primarily from his ambition to progress in his career and his
abhorrence of personal risk. Also, the DEA needed someone with Heeney’s skills.

When the DEA was first established in 1909, its goal was efficiency rather than
policy-making. It had gradually assumed a more proactive policy role, linked to Canada’s
overall decolonization, to which control over external policy was critical.28 O.D. Skelton, for
whom national independence was a foreign policy priority, had steered the department to a
more far-reaching policy function, although he did so with a small staff, few foreign service
officers, and a limited budget. By the start of the Second World War, there were
approximately 200 department employees (including stenographers, translators, clerks and
people in the passport office), representation in seven countries (Britain, the United States,

26
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France, Switzerland, Japan, Belgium, and the Netherlands), and a budget of just over $1
million. The department expanded rapidly during the war. The demands of postwar
reconstruction did not ease the work of the department. As a result, growth continued. In
1951, Canada had 49 offices abroad, the department of external affairs had 1353 employees,
and the budget was just over $10 million.29 The organization of the department had not kept
up with the growth. The result was strain and inefficiency.
Heeney’s predecessors as under-secretary had not paid particular attention to the
organization of the department. Skelton was neither adept at nor interested in administration.
He was also too over-worked, in part because of inefficient organization, to think about
administration. Lester Pearson had complained about the need to ‘pull… External Affairs
and the Foreign Service apart and put…it back together again’, but he regretted that Skelton
had ‘no inclination’ to oversee a restructuring of the department.30 Norman Robertson was
notoriously disorganized: the inefficiencies of the department could not be fixed by an undersecretary who lost memos in the detritus of his desk (some said he did this deliberately). As
Hugh Keenleyside observed, Robertson thought about administration as he did his clothing:
‘something that was there and was useful but hardly worth any great or continuous
attention.’31 In fact, Robertson did recognize that the department was not functioning
smoothly. Hume Wrong and Hugh Keenleyside drafted proposals to improve the efficiency
of the department. In 1941, Keenleyside’s version was partially implemented: four divisions
were established: Diplomatic & Economic; Commonwealth & European; American & Far
Eastern; and Legal. But the divisions reflected the interests and expertise of senior foreign
service officers (Beaudry, Pearson, Keenleyside and Read). The structure and scope of the
department therefore remained highly personalized and idiosyncratic. Despite the creation of
additional subdivisions (called sections), an artificial separation between geography and

29
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function persisted and some matters were dealt with in a piecemeal fashion.32 Lester Pearson
replaced Robertson as USSEA and he was also mainly interested in diplomacy. As Heeney
wrote of his friend, Pearson had neither time nor taste for administration.33 Despite chronic
complaints about poor organization and the widespread recognition that the business of
Canada’s external policy suffered as a result, the department remained set in its ways.
Heeney’s accession to the under-secretary’s position also occurred at a time when
confidence in Canada’s importance in world affairs soared. As John Holmes put it, Canada
metamorphosized from ‘a wartime junior partner…to…a sure-footed middle power with an
acknowledged and applauded rôle in world affairs’.34 The senior mandarins in Ottawa
spurned the colonial mentality35 of the past and moved confidently in international
policymaking circles, where connections forged at Oxford sometimes proved useful. They
assumed a prominent role in international councils such as the United Nations. They
affirmed Canada’s independent standing in world affairs, not by focusing on issues of status
but rather on questions of substance, such as the workings of the postwar international
economic order, the structure and purpose of the United Nations, and the treatment of
refugees after the war. Outside observers appreciated that Canada’s DEA was on the move.
James Meade was a British civil servant who specialized in the reconstruction of postwar
economic institutions; his work brought him into contact with many Canadian officials. He
came to admire Canada’s mandarins: ‘the young men who are up and coming in the
Canadian public service are very definite radicals and progressives….they are impatient to

32
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see that there is a very definite advance in Canada.’36 Charles Ritchie also conveyed the
feeling of importance that prevailed in Ottawa and the DEA in the early 1950s when he
observed –disapprovingly - that ‘almost any man in official Ottawa would rather talk to a
Cabinet Minister than to the most beautiful woman in the room’.37

By the time Heeney joined the department, its organization had improved slightly, but
rapid growth and an ever-broadening scope for Canada’s involvement in world affairs, meant
that inefficiencies and disorganization persisted, badly affecting department morale. Charles
Ritchie lamented that department officers and staff were over-worked to the point of
exhaustion. He also lamented that the department culture celebrated overwork: ‘There is an
underlying assumption that anyone who is not overworked, underpaid, eye-strained, joystarved – in fact, not a senior civil servant – is frivolous or materialistic, that these are the
hallmarks of a higher calling, the stigmata of the faithful.’38 Heeney recognized that the staff
and foreign service officers were strained and this undermined the work of the department.
As Heeney wrote on the eve of his term as under-secretary, ‘I am in no doubt that the
atmosphere in the Department and the confidence among the senior officers are not what they
should be.’39 Administrative skill had become the top requirement for the under-secretary.
Lester Pearson, by then secretary of state, therefore selected Heeney, who was well known
for his administrative talents.
There were critics of Heeney’s appointment. Some senior diplomats preferred to
recruit from within for the top department post.40 Certainly, Heeney was not particularly
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knowledgeable about world affairs. He went through a crash course in diplomacy, tutored by
close friends and senior DEA officers like Escott Reid, as well as real world events like the
Berlin blockade and the war in Korea. Despite the pressure and urgency of international
developments stemming from a Cold War that was growing dangerously hot, his priority was
to bring order to the department. Although most officials believed policy work was more
‘stimulating and prestigious’ than figuring out how to manage the department, Heeney
believed that ‘firm, decisive, and prompt action in such affairs as departmental organization
at home, recruiting, training, and perhaps most of all, suitable manning of our posts abroad,
was of immediate, and in some cases of first, importance.’41
One of Heeney’s first steps was to enlarge the senior management of the department
so that work could be better distributed.42 He created the position of deputy under secretary
and added one more assistant under-secretary position, bringing the total to three. The
responsibilities of the senior officials combined region and function and gave them broad
oversight. For instance, Charles Ritchie was responsible for four divisions, two involving
liaison with the department of national defence, Europe, and Information. Jules Léger was
responsible for the Latin American component of the American/Far East division, as well as
the Commonwealth, Consular, Protocol, and Supplies and Properties divisions. The
delegation of responsibility freed up the under secretary for overall coordination of
departmental activity and consultation with the minister. And as Heeney considered how to
make the divisions function more effectively, he first considered the work they had to
undertake and second which officers should be assigned to them. This meant that substantive

have been the best of all the under-secretaries in the fifties and sixties’. Radical Mandarin: The
Memoirs of Escott Reid (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989), 243.
41

Heeney, Caesar, 99.

42

I am endebted to John Hilliker and Donald Barry have who explained this work in Canada’s

Department of External Affairs: Volune II: Coming of Age, 1946-1968 (Montreal & Kingston:
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1995). Many of the changes and additions resembled the blueprint
drawn up by Hugh Keenleyside during the war. Keenleyside had consulted with Heeney about his
proposal and noted that Heeney had approved of the changes. Keenleyside, Memoirs, Vol. 2, 116.

12

foreign policy and foreign relations issues determined the structure and composition of
department rather than the interests, expertise and inclination of Canadian diplomats.

Heeney also oversaw the enlargement and reordering of those divisions responsible
for administration related to foreign affairs. With the creation of a far-reaching international
order after the war, Canada found itself a member of many organizations, all involving
meetings and conferences. In 1949 alone, Canada sent representatives to over 125
conferences. The International Conference Section was set up to deal with the voluminous
and detailed planning involved in participation in international conferences. The
administration of the department itself also had to improve. The Administrative Division
was therefore divided into three sections: Finance, Establishments and Organization,
Supplies and Properties. And the personnel division was given a broader mandate and a
larger staff. It was also headed by Marcel Cadieux, a diplomat of the first rank who became
under-secretary in the 1960s.

Heeney believed that foreign reporting was one of the most important activities of the
diplomatic corps because the information relayed and analysed from London, Karachi, or
Tokyo became the basis for actual policies.43 He was taken to task in his appearances before
the House of Commons standing committee on external affairs for the large telephone bills of
the department.44 But increased communication between the outposts and the centre was, in
Heeney’s mind, a much needed improvement. Information did not just need to be collected;
it had to be communicated. Weekly digests of the principal policy issues confronting the
department were sent to officials posted abroad so that they could better understand the full
scope of Canadian foreign policy as well as the broader context in which their mission fell.
The summary was also circulated internally and was particularly helpful to officials working
in administrative sections.45 Heeney himself took intermittent charge of individual divisions
43
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so that he could better understand their work and challenges. He held more meetings so that
information could be communicated and ideas discussed. Institutional memory through
accurate and comprehensive record keeping was also crucial. To serve this role, the
Directorate of Historical Research and Reports was set up at the end of 1950: it consisted of a
library, press clipping service, and archives.

His views about communication were not limited to intra-departmental exchanges. A
Press Office was set up in 1950 to respond to questions from the media. Spreading
information about Canada around the world was another important diplomatic function. This
could take the form of high level meetings with government officials as well as more
grassroots events, such as speaking to a Kiwanis Club in Connecticut.46 Wide distribution of
ministerial speeches at home and abroad also helped.

Heeney appreciated that the work environment as well as conditions of work had an
impact on the effectiveness of diplomats. Although many thought of a career in the foreign
service as a calling, Heeney understood it was also a job which placed serious strains on
individuals and families. Diplomats and their families endured ‘endless and exhausting
problems of housing and schooling and the thousand and one personal difficulties involved in
adaptation to new and often strange ways of life.’47 He wanted to improve the conditions of
work for Canadian officials abroad. In 1950 he spent five weeks touring Canadian missions
to gather first hand knowledge of work conditions. His diaries reveal the close attention he
paid to furnishings, heating, equipment, the grounds, and staffing.48 Upon his return, he set
up an advisory committee on ‘mission housekeeping’ to deal with the management and
maintenance of offices abroad.49 Issues of salary and allowances, to which he paid close
attention during his own career, was a broader concern within the department. Three new
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FSO grades were added, creating more opportunities for promotion and, along with it, higher
pay.
Under Heeney’s guidance, the department of external affairs did not grow. Rather he
used existing resources to reorganize the department. The highly personalized system that
had developed under Skelton yielded to a system of efficiency, systematization, and
routine.50 Instead of having an administrative logic that stemmed from the talents,
inclinations, and effort of the under-secretary and senior officers, he embedded
organizational practices that would persist regardless of changes in personnel. The scope and
activities of the department did not stem from the beliefs, priorities or expertise of individual
members of the diplomatic corps, but from the realities of global geopolitics in the early
years of the Cold War. As John Hilliker has pointed out, some members of the department
resented these changes because they made the department more formal and more like other
departments.51

The relationship between Heeney and Lester Pearson, a close friend and now his
boss, is less easy to gauge. Traditionally, the under-secretary was also the main policy
adviser to the minister of the department. Wilfrid Laurier had counted on Sir Joseph Pope
for guidance, as Carmen Miller discusses in his chapter. Mackenzie King had relied on the
advice of Skelton and, after his death in 1941, Norman Robertson. Indeed, Mackenzie King
would only consult with the under-secretary which made the workload almost unbearable,
particularly because of King’s tendency to micro-manage the department.52 When Louis St.
Laurent became secretary of state, Pearson was under-secretary. They had the same general
50
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aims and conception of Canadian foreign policy and St. Laurent had great confidence in his
under-secretary.53 Their consultation was often informal but extensive. In 1948, Pearson
moved to the political sphere, and became secretary of state. Pearson was less comfortable
as a politician than he had been as a diplomat. In 1949, Heeney observed that Pearson was
both tired and nervous and although he was adjusting to a political role, ‘he is finding it hard
to maintain his normal buoyancy’. One consequence was that Pearson had little time for
running the department, which gave Heeney wide berth over general administration.54
However, the strains and demands on Pearson as a politician did not make him rely on the
under-secretary for policy advice, for several reasons. First, his cohort in the department –
Reid, Wrong, Robertson – among many others, seem to have access to him. Second, he was
already an expert in the field, certainly more experienced than Heeney. Jack Granatstein has
also speculated that Pearson wanted to keep his own council; Heeney was especially
appealing as an under-secretary because he did not have a particular vision of Canadian
involvement in world affairs.55 The extant private correspondence between them does not
show Heeney as advisor. Pearson’s letters to him contained information about his activities
and developments in other countries; there was a gossipy element to them; but he did not ask
for guidance.56 Much of the correspondence also concerns Heeney’s hopes for his next
posting: he lobbied hard for the Washington embassy.57 The Heeney-Pearson working
53
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relationship was therefore characterized by a division of labour and the advisory function
was downgraded, a circumstance particular to Heeney’s term.58

However, it would be misleading to characterize Heeney as only an administrator.
He did have strong views about foreign affairs and the work of diplomats. He knew that
many members of the department believed that a diplomat’s time and energy should
concentrate on high diplomacy and questions related to national security and international
stability. He disagreed with this view. As he put it, the scope of international relations
ranged from ‘potatoes to peace’.59 In particular, Heeney emphasized the importance of trade
as a vital and growing element of Canadian foreign policy as well as a point of intersection
between his department and the department of trade and commerce.60 Diplomats should
therefore be engaged in promoting trade and trade officials should work closely with the
department. For instance, he believed that trade and consular work should be part of the
same office abroad.61 It was characteristic of Heeney to appreciate the substantive
implications of a more mundane aspect of international relations. There was resistance to his
efforts which he believed was rooted in elitist conceptions of what the diplomatic corps was
58
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all about. Heeney dug in his heels. In his opinion, ‘any ambassador who did not put the
advancement of Canada’s commercial interest near the top of his priorities was not fit to head
a mission’.62 When he was ambassador in Washington, he estimated that 70% of the
mission’s time was taken up with economic issues.63
Heeney’s leadership of the department was bolstered by sound judgment and decisive
action, particularly in crisis such as the start of the Korean war and American attempts to
question Herbert Norman about alleged communist affiliations. Heeney’s response to
repeated American allegations of communist tendencies was principled, thorough and
reasonable. He did not believe that Norman had violated national security and should not be
subjected to the zealotry of the McCarthy hearings. He stated his position unequivocally to
the State Department.64

Ambassador to Washington and Canadian-American Relations:
Heeney was under-secretary for just over three years. After a brief and unwelcome
posting to NATO (then located in Paris), he served two terms in Washington, from 1953 to
1957 and 1959-1962. In between these posting he was chairman of the Canadian Civil
Service Commission, a job from which he grudgingly departed when the Diefenbaker
government recalled him.65 His time in Washington turned him into an expert on CanadianAmerican relations, with strong views about Canada’s international interests and the manner
in which its diplomacy should be conducted. This will be discussed briefly, to show that
Heeney was more than an organizational expert.
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Heeney’s first posting was challenging and stimulating; the second term was more
taxing as relations between the United States and Canada became even more strained,
exacerbated by personality clashes between President Kennedy and Prime Minister
Diefenbaker and differences in outlook related to the Cold War. In Heeney’s attempts to
promote greater understanding between policy makers in Washington and Ottawa, he spent
much time lobbying his own government. Heeney was particularly alarmed by antiAmerican rhetoric and policies. He disagreed with the government’s concerns about joint air
defence and nuclear weapons.66 He was horrified at the prospect that the prime minister
might disclose the so-called Rostow memo in order to score political points.67 Heeney was
alarmed when Howard Green, his Minister, dismissed Heeney’s warnings that the antiAmerican slant of Canadian foreign policy was a cause of concern in the State Department.
Heeney disparaged the conflation of patriotism and anti-Americanism. Canadian antiAmericanism was based on ‘ignorance of U.S. institutions and habits and a lack of
appreciation of U.S. problems domestic and international’ as well as an unwarranted sense
of superiority: ‘And in many things we are – without any justification – smug and self
satisfied in the conviction that we have managed to combine the best qualities of Britain and
America – and maybe France too, whereas the facts are quite other that we exemplify some
of the least attractive characteristics of all.’68

His forceful objection to anti-American rhetoric and policies revealed his own belief
that a close relationship with the US was ‘our most precious international asset’.69 Heeney
also believed that private, informal and candid discussions with his American colleagues
were the most effective approach to take. And this approach worked, according to Heeney,
because American officials from the president down valued their country’s relationship with
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Canada and were unfailingly available to meet with their Canadian colleagues.70 His
understanding of the Cold War affected the importance that he attached to CanadianAmerican relations. Although a growing constituency in Canada drifted toward a more
neutral view of the Cold War in the later 1950s, according to which the Soviet Union was not
solely responsible for the conflict, Heeney believed that the Soviet Union was an imperialist
power that used subversive means to topple democracies. He explained this to a Montreal
audience in 1951, when he was under-secretary:

To all who were neither blind nor unwilling to see, it had become plain before the end of
1947 that, to further their imperialist ends, the Soviet government were determined to block,
bully and undermine their former allies and to propagate their communist gospel by any and
every means of internal subversion and external pressure.71

This view did not change and he had no sympathy for the neutralist line favored by
Howard Green. He described Green as ‘an innocent abroad … underneath inclined to a sort
of pacific neo-isolationism.’72 However, he did not see world affairs exclusively through a
Cold War filter and he was troubled by the rigid, ideological, Cold War mentality that
prevailed in the US. His characterization of American officialdom as ‘generous, charming
and often frightening’ captured his nuanced view of his American counterparts.73 Nor was
he reflexively pro-American. He forcefully represented and defended Canadian interests.
But his assessment of Canada’s stature in world affairs – it was not a major player74 –
reinforced his commitment to quiet diplomacy as the most constructive way to address
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problems between the US and Canada. His American colleagues understood and respected
the balance that he struck between ‘close collaboration’ and ‘independence of action’.75

The Merchant-Heeney report of 1965 reiterated his commitment to quiet diplomacy
and congenial Canadian-American relations. The report was commissioned by the Canadian
and American governments to examine the causes of disagreement in their relationship.
Heeney, then one of Canada’s representative to the International Joint Commission (and
chair of the Canadian section), along with Livingston Merchant, former two term US
ambassador to Canada, were the principal authors. Their endorsement of quiet diplomacy
was labelled a ‘sell-out’ by Canadians and the media who increasingly equated this approach
with subservience to the US and complicity in objectionable American foreign policies such
as the war in Vietnam.76 Heeney was also criticized by his colleagues in the department,
many of whom believed that robust representation was called for in dealings with the US.77
Heeney was indignant at the reaction: he believed the criticism stemmed from taking one
brief passage out of context and confirmed the appeal of anti-Americanism, behaviour which
he regarded as childish.78 He insisted that if the Canadian aim was to influence American
foreign policy, ‘then direct public confrontation is the last and usually the most unpromising
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resort.’79 The Merchant-Heeney report was his final foray into Canadian foreign relations.
He retired early in 1970 and died just before the year’s end.

Conclusion:
Heeney’s talents for organization and administration were well-known and widely
respected. He was called upon to organize everything, including friendly inter-departmental
hockey games, bachelor parties (for Malcolm MacDonald) and memorial services. Although
he had some definite views about particular issues related to foreign policy and foreign
relations, he was not one of the intellectuals in the department of external affairs. But
Heeney did not suffer from a sense of inferiority. He understood the value of his
organizational talents; so did those who worked with him.80 In 1963, he was awarded the
Vanier Medal for public service and public administration, a recognition of his impressive
contribution to the efficient functioning of government. It is appropriate to think of Heeney
not just as an Ottawa Man, but also an Organization Man. However, he did not fit the
soulless and drab image associated with men in gray flannel suits.81 His humour, warmth
and decency made him a cherished friend. His appreciation of the importance of process,
record-keeping and communication – seemingly mundane matters – were essential to the
DEA at a time when the scope of work expanded and the pace quickened. Although he was
innovative in the way he restructured the department and he had a long-term influence on its
institutional development, he was more of a renovator than an architect. Because he came to
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the department from outside, he was able to assess the department with a dispassionate eye: it
was no coincidence that the department’s first substantial re-organization was undertaken by
someone who had not been nurtured in the highly personalized system which had developed
before the Second World War. Even though Arnold Heeney’s appointment as under
secretary was a departure – the first real administrator – he redefined that position so that his
successors would have to be, in some measure, organization men too.82
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